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“How social norms change” is not only a theoretical question but also an empirical one.
Many organizations have implemented programs to abandon harmful social norms. These
programs are standardly monitored and evaluated with a set of empirical tools. While
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of changes in objective outcomes and behaviors is well-
developed, wewill argue that M&E of changes in the wide range of beliefs and preferences
important to social norms is still problematic. In this paper, we ﬁrst present a theoretical
framework and then show how it should guide social norms measurement. As a case
study, we focus on the harmful practice of child marriage. We show how an operational
theory of social norms can guide the design of surveys, experiments, and vignettes. We
use examples from existing research to illustrate how to study social norms change.
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INTRODUCTION
“How social norms change” is not only a theoretical question
but also an empirical and a practical one. Many organizations—
governmental, intergovernmental, and non-governmental—try to
design programs to end harmful social norms that impact the
well-being of millions of people. These programs are standardly
monitored and evaluated with a set of empirical tools. While
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of changes in objective out-
comes and behaviors works well, we will argue that M&E of
changes in the wide range of beliefs and preferences important
to social norms is still problematic. Social norms are a kind of
collective practice. Measurement should be guided by an ade-
quate theory of collective practices that can be operationalized
in order to distinguish social norms from other practices. Such
a theory is often lacking. In this paper, we present a structured
approach to the diagnostic of collective practices. We ﬁrst intro-
duce a theoretical framework and then show how it can guide
measurement.
To illustrate how to add social norms to an M&E frame-
work, we focus on the harmful practice of child marriage1,
as it provides an interesting case study. Child marriage is on
1Child marriage is a marriage in which at least one of the spouses is less than
18 years old. In most cases, it is the girl who is still a child. Child marriage is also
more problematic for girls. Therefore, we focus on girls in this paper, although for
simplicity we will still talk about child marriage.
the decline, but it is still a widespread practice. It occurs in
many different areas of the world, from Africa to the Asian
subcontinent. It is a violation of human rights—more specif-
ically, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child—and it has very harmful consequences: (1) even when
the marriage is not forced, young girls are often too immature
to give their well-reasoned consent to the marriage (Mikhail,
2002; Gaffney-Rhys, 2011;); (2) by taking away childhood and
the chance of an education, child marriage inhibits girls’ per-
sonal development andmakes learning and practicing a profession
extremely difﬁcult (Amin et al., 1998; Mikhail, 2002); (3) girls risk
sexual abuse and violence by their husbands (Raj et al., 2010);
and (4) early pregnancies increase risks of disease and even
death of mother or child (Mahavarkar et al., 2008; Raj, 2010;
Raj and Boehmer, 2013).
There has been much research on child marriage, both empir-
ical and theoretical, with an eye to abandoning it. Scholars have
developed tools to measure different aspects of child marriage
and they have offered explanations about the origin and persis-
tence of this practice. While there has been substantial progress
in child marriage research, we believe that the existing research
suffers from three problems. First, there are too many expla-
nations of child marriage, and it is not clear how the different
determinants identiﬁed by these explanations ﬁt together. Second,
explanations of child marriage often lack theoretical rigor. Some
scholars might recognize that child marriage is a “social norm,”
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but at the same time they might refer to it as “culture,” a “practice,”
an “institution,” a “custom,” a “convention,” or a “moral” imper-
ative, and there is no theory behind any of this2. Related to this
is the third problem: there are measurement tools available for
M&Eof progress in ending childmarriage, including tools to get at
“social norms,”but these instruments also lack rigorous theoretical
backing.
In this paper, we offer a general theoretical framework that
can, ﬁrst, help integrate the different explanations of child mar-
riage and, second, guide the development of measurement tools
essential for child marriage M&E. Our theoretical framework
approaches social norms through insights into how individuals
make decisions. The collective practice of child marriage is ulti-
mately a cluster of individual behaviors, so that, if we want to
understand it, we have to understand why individuals behave
in certain ways. One important aspect of people’s behavior is
that it is often inﬂuenced by what others do and by what others
think should be done. A social norm is present when behav-
ior is inﬂuenced in that manner (Bicchieri, 2006, 2014). We
show that a rigorous theoretical framework based on these ideas
is a useful guide for the M&E of progress in changing social
norms.
In the second section, we introduce a simple model that
explains the behaviors of individuals—including the behaviors
that sustain the practice of child marriage—by the preferences
they have, the options they have to choose from, and the beliefs
they have about these options. We argue that collective practices
like child marriage can be sustained by two kinds of prefer-
ences, namely unconditional and conditional preferences, and two
kinds of beliefs, namely non-social beliefs and social expecta-
tions. Mapping the full range of preferences and beliefs makes
it possible to determine whether a collective practice is a social
norm or not. In the third section, we discuss different types
of practices (customs, moral rules, conventions, social norms,
etc.), and we show why it is crucial, for designing effective
interventions, to understand what type of practice child mar-
riage is. We also show that collective practices can be sustained
by false beliefs. Because informing people about the falsity of
these beliefs can contribute to ending child marriage, we argue
that it is important that child marriage M&E includes mea-
suring the “local knowledge” that may generate false factual
beliefs as well as the social expectations that may prove to be
wrong.
In the next three sections we assess different measurement
tools and their role in a diagnostic for collective practices. In
the fourth section, we discuss the most commonly used tool
in research on collective practices, namely “knowledge, atti-
tude, and practice” surveys. We argue that even if one reﬁnes
2For instance, in their interesting review of programs to end child marriage,
Malhotra et al. (2011) write: “efforts …attempt to change underlying social norms
that perpetuate the practice of child marriage” (p. 6, emphasis added); “parental
education and community mobilization attempt to change social norms and forge
a more supportive, less punitive environment for girls and families who are willing
and ready to change the custom of early marriage” (p. 13, emphasis added); and
“child marriage prevention programs …aim to change deeply entrenched social and
cultural practices” (p. 24, emphasis added). But what is the difference between a
“practice,” a “custom,” and a “social norm,” and what does it mean for a practice to
be “social” or “cultural”?
these surveys several problems remain, namely, how to evalu-
ate the causal role of beliefs, how to obtain truthful answers,
and how to obtain accurate answers. In the ﬁfth section, we
show that incentivized experiments offer a partial remedy. Lab-
oratory experiments, however, take place in rareﬁed condi-
tions and in the sixth section we argue that in-kind incentives
and vignettes provide a more realistic solution that mimics
experiments while being feasible in the context of harmful
practices like child marriage. The last section concludes the
paper.
CHILD MARRIAGE AND THE PREFERENCES, OPTIONS, AND
BELIEFS MODEL
Monitoring and evaluating progress in ending social norms
requires a solid theoretical framework. In this section we present
such a framework based on a simple model of decision-making,
namely the preferences, options, and beliefs model (see Gintis,
2007). To illustrate the necessity of a general theoretical frame-
work, we discuss the status quo in research on understanding child
marriage.
Child marriage does not lack explanations. If anything, child
marriage has too many explanations. Here is a list of explanations
that have been given for the origin and persistence of child mar-
riage (see for instance UNICEF, 2001; Jain and Kurz, 2007; Loaiza
and Wong, 2012; Verma et al., 2013):
(1) Conciliation: Marriages are primarily an instrument to bring
families closer together, pay debts, or solve conﬂicts.
(2) Why-Educate: Parents are too poor to pay for the girl’s
upbringing, and marriage means one less mouth to feed.
Moreover, there are no schools in the neighborhood, and there
are no jobs for women.
(3) Dowry: Parents have to pay higher dowries or accept lower
bride prices for older girls. Potential grooms, or their families,
prefer young brides.
(4) Safeguard: If (good) grooms are scarce, it is best to marry
whenever a (good) possibility arises.
(5) Chastity: Parents want their daughters to be chaste, and
there is a risk that girls who grow older lose their virgin-
ity outside marriage, because they might have love affairs or
they might be raped. Here are some variants of the Chastity
explanation:
• Ignorance-about-Chastity: Parents overestimate the
risk of love affairs (and rape).
• Chastity-Norm: Daughters are expected to be chaste,
and the slightest suggestion of premarital sex would
ruin the reputation of both daughter and parents.
• Ignorance-about-Chastity-Norm: Parents overesti-
mate the extent to which others expect them to have
chaste daughters.
(6) Conformity: All girls are getting married young. Here is a
variant of the Conformity explanation:
• Ignorance-about-Conformity: Parents overestimate
the number of girls that are getting married young.
(7) Tradition: Childmarriage is just a“custom,”a“tradition,”part
of people’s “culture.”
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(8) Housewife: People, girls included, believe girls should be
good wives and mothers, and their well-being and personal
development is less important.
(9) Ignorance-about-Harm: People underestimate the harm
child marriage causes.
(10) Docility: Girls lack the capabilities to promote their own
interests.
(11) Law: There are no laws forbidding child marriage or, if there
are, they are not enforced. Here is a variant of the Law
explanation:
• Ignorance-about-Law: The laws forbidding child
marriage are not known.
(12) Juliet: Children themselves desire love and marriage.
You might wonder: if there are so many explanations already,
why do we still need a theoretical framework to guide M&E?
The answer is that the listed explanations do not provide a
sufﬁciently general theoretical framework. They are partial expla-
nations rather than encompassing theories of child marriage. The
listed explanations explain only some features of child marriage,
and they apply only to some regions and to different times. Hence,
we still need an encompassing theory to develop a systematic
approach to monitoring change in child marriage. This theory
needs to be sufﬁciently general so that it can include all the partial
explanations listed above.
To build such a general theoretical framework, we start with
a simple economic model of behavior and gradually add reﬁne-
ments. According to economists, people behave in a certain way
because they maximally satisfy their preferences given the limited
options they have. The Why-Educate explanation nicely illustrates
this economic way of thinking about decision-making. A father
prefers to have as much food, clothes, and other goods as possible,
but his options are limited. First, he faces a budget constraint: the
money he invests in his daughter’s education—in the hope that
she will get a job and provide for the family—cannot be used to
buy goods today. He will have to choose. Second, there are struc-
tural constraints: if there are no schools for girls or no jobs for
women, the return on the father’s investment is nil. The Dowry
explanation ﬁts the preference-satisfaction-given-limited-options
mold too. Like education costs, dowries are costs that limit par-
ents’ options: they cannot both save money on a lower dowry
and postpone the wedding—they have to choose. To understand
people’s behavior we thus need to understand both people’s pref-
erences and the limited options they have when trying to satisfy
these preferences.
Now, the preferences of parents are of course not purely self-
regarding. Parents also care about their daughters: they want them
to ﬁnd a good husband, to be good wives, to have children, to
be happy, etc. They want that for their daughters, not necessarily
because they will get something from it. In other words, parents
have other-regarding preferences: preferences about the well-being
of others rather than their own well-being. Other-regarding pref-
erences also play a role in explaining child marriage. According to
the Safeguard explanation, if grooms are scarce and parents want
their daughters to enjoy the bliss of marriage, they will marry
them off when the opportunity arises. This means that parents
maximally satisfy other-regarding preferences given the limited
marriage options they have. Likewise, if the slightest suggestion
of premarital sex would ruin the reputation of a girl and thus
her chance of getting married, it is in her own interest to be
married off early, and some parents do so for the sake of their
daughters—this is a variant of the Chastity-Norm explanation.
Since preferences—self-regarding and other-regarding—play an
important role in explaining the behavior of the parents, child
marriage M&E must carefully elicit these preferences.
Earlier we mentioned that child marriage is detrimental for the
girls’ development and health. So you might wonder why parents
still marry off their daughters so young if they care about their
well-being. According to the Ignorance-about-Harm explanation,
parents might just underestimate the extent of the harm child
marriage causes. Parents might falsely believe that the beneﬁts
of an early marriage outweigh the harm. Hence, to understand
how people make decisions, we need to understand not only
(1) their preferences and (2) the limited options they have in trying
to satisfy these preferences, but also (3) the (true or false) beliefs
they hold about their options. This implies that programs to end
harmful norms can aim at changing preferences, options, and/or
beliefs, and M&E will have to encompass measures of (changes in)
preferences, options, and/or beliefs.
We now gradually reﬁne the preferences, options, and beliefs
model, by clarifying the kinds of preferences and beliefs that inﬂu-
ence people’s behavior. The Chastity explanation, for instance, is
ambiguous about the type of beliefs that support the child mar-
riage decision. Parents may have prudential reasons to demand
chastity: they may believe that, if the girl is not married off early,
she might have love affairs and ruin her chance of a decent mar-
riage. However, parents might also have moral reasons: they might
believe that women should be chaste and that it would be morally
bad for the daughter to have premarital sex. In other words, their
belief might not be factual, but normative, namely a belief about
what should be done—and what should not be done. Normative
beliefs often make people punish those who do not do what they
should do by gossiping about them, by socially excluding them or
worse, as when a girl is killed to restore family honor.
There is yet another alternative. Parents might not believe
themselves that girls should be chaste, but they might believe that
others believe girls should be chaste, and parents do not want to
go against the normative beliefs of others—or they do not want
to get punished. Beliefs about what others think should be done—
and whether others might punish deviants—are called normative
expectations (Bicchieri, 2006). They contrast with personal beliefs
about what should be done, which we call personal normative
beliefs. While personal normative beliefs are ﬁrst-order beliefs,
normative expectations are second-order beliefs: beliefs about
what others believe, that is, “beliefs about beliefs” (Bicchieri, 2006,
p. 15, 2014, Chap. 1). More speciﬁcally, normative expectations are
expectations about others’ personal normative beliefs—and about
the sanctions they may enforce.
Another important set of beliefs is beliefs about what others do,
as people seldom care only about what others think should be done
(Bicchieri and Xiao, 2009). Parents might decide to marry off their
young daughters because they believe other parents do so. Beliefs
about the behavior of others are called empirical expectations
(Bicchieri, 2006). Empirical and normative expectations are
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beliefs about others; we call these beliefs about others social
expectations.
The personal belief that one should behave in a certain way is
not a belief about others—it is not a“social”belief. The same canbe
said about the beliefs about the consequences of early marriage.
We call the latter factual beliefs, in contrast with both personal
normative beliefs and social expectations. Like personal normative
beliefs, factual beliefs are“non-social”; like empirical expectations,
factual beliefs are “non-normative.” Table 1 illustrates the two
dimensions according to which we can categorize beliefs: their
being social or not, and their being normative or not.
DISTINGUISHING SOCIAL NORMS FROM OTHER COLLECTIVE
PRACTICES
The reﬁned preferences, options, and beliefs modelmakes it possible
to give a clear deﬁnition of what a social norm is and to distin-
guish social norms from other collective practices. In this section,
we explain how to categorize collective practices and why know-
ing exactly what kind of collective practice we are dealing with is
important when we want to enact change.
For identifying social norms, the distinction between non-
social beliefs and social expectations is crucial. We call people’s
preferences that are conditional on social expectations conditional
preferences, in contrast with unconditional preferences like self-
regarding, other-regarding, and moral preferences. The latter are
not conditional on what others do or think. A social norm then is
a collective practice sustained by empirical and normative expec-
tations and by preferences conditional on both these expectations
(Bicchieri, 2006, p. 11).
This deﬁnition should be further speciﬁed in the following
ways. First, not all social expectations matter for social norms.
When a father’s preferences about his daughter’s marriage are con-
ditional on his expectations about what others do and think, he
does not care about what people do and think in other countries,
cities, or far away villages. He will care about what speciﬁc peo-
ple do or think, namely those who belong to his reference network
(Bicchieri, 2014, Chap. 1). The reference network of the father
in our example might include other families in his village, the
village elders, religious leaders, and perhaps also relatives in dis-
tant villages. Who exactly belongs to people’s reference network
is an empirical question. Second, it will seldom be the case that
everybody in one’s reference network will behave and think in
the same way on every issue. But it is enough that many peo-
ple behave or think in a similar way for people to be inﬂuenced.
Exactly how much collective conformity is necessary to inﬂuence
one’s behavior is again an empirical question, but it is easy to
Table 1 | Classification of beliefs.
Non-social beliefs Social beliefs/expectations
Non-normative
beliefs
Factual beliefs Empirical expectations
Normative beliefs Personal normative
beliefs
Normative expectations
think of social norms as being based on expectations about at least
a majority (Bicchieri, 2006, p. 12).
Scholars sometimes conclude too quickly from the fact that a
practice is widespread that it must be a “social norm.” However,
not all collective practices are social norms, as our discussion of the
different explanations of childmarriage should have illustrated. By
merely observing a collective practice like child marriage, we do
not know what is the nature of the practice, because we do not
know why people endorse it.
First, as theWhy-Education and Dowry explanations illustrate,
the practice of child marriage could just be sustained by self-
regarding or other-regarding preferences, in which case it would
be a rational response. For instance, parents might be just calculat-
ing that it would cost too much money to keep their daughters at
home. If all parents think like that, youmay observe a homogenous
collective practice that is the result of each individual calculating
what best fulﬁlls his or her interest regardless of what others do.
Second, child marriage might be just something that is tradi-
tionally done in certain communities. The reason for it might have
been long forgotten, but people still do it because that is what they
have been taught to do. In that case, we would call child marriage
a custom.
Third, child marriage could also be sustained by moral prefer-
ences, based on personal normative beliefs, which would make it a
moral rule. If child marriage is mainly due to parents holding the
personal normative belief that women should be chaste and pro-
tected, it is a moral rule. Of course, in a community that shares
moral rules, parents may also have (correct) normative expec-
tations about what other parents believe one should do. Yet we
should be able to distinguish between the inﬂuence of personal
normative beliefs and normative expectations. If child marriage
were to be primarily due to parents having the normative expecta-
tion that others hold that women should be chaste and protected,
regardless of the personal normative beliefs they may hold, then
we would be entitled to say it is a social norm.
Finally, even if child marriage were to depend on social expec-
tations, it is still possible that it is not a social norm, because it
is at least theoretically possible that it would depend on empiri-
cal expectations alone. Practices that depend solely on empirical
expectations are called descriptive norms (Bicchieri, 2006, 2014).
Driving on the right side of the road is an example of a descriptive
norm or, more speciﬁcally, a convention. Driving on the right side
of the road is not a social norm because people’s driving on the
right side is not conditional on their normative expectation that
others believe they should drive on the right side. Rather, they
simply do not want to crash into other people. Child marriage
is probably not a convention like driving on the right side of the
road, although there are conventional aspects to child marriage:
the parents of girls have to coordinate with the parents of boys (or
withmen) onwhen tomarry. In linewith theChastity explanation,
normative expectations most likely matter too.
Knowing whether child marriage is a rational response, a cus-
tom, a moral rule, a descriptive norm, or a social norm is very
important for designing effective policies. If child marriage is a
rational response, the incentives need to be changed. If child mar-
riage is a custom, it is fairly easily abandoned: if people realize
that the reason why a certain custom was once established no
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longer holds, they will be inclined to abandon it, especially when
presented with satisfactory alternatives.
Whether child marriage is a descriptive norm or a social norm,
change must still occur collectively, in a coordinated way (Mackie,
1996; Bicchieri, 2012; Bicchieri and Mercier, 2014). Since people’s
behavior depends on what others in their reference network do
and think, they will not change their behavior unless others do so
as well. Hence, the entire reference network needs to participate in
the change. We cannot adopt a piecemeal approach, starting with
a few individuals and hoping to expand gradually.
Moreover, if a practice is a social norm rather than a descriptive
norm, it is important to changenormative expectations. In the case
of child marriage, this might mean that one has to change not only
people’s personal normative beliefs that child marriage is valuable
but also their normative expectations that others who matter to
them value and approve of child marriage.
Finally, whatever kind of practice child marriage is, it is pos-
sible that it is based on false beliefs, which opens new routes for
intervention. Although one cannot argue about preferences, one
can challenge beliefs3. From an M&E point of view, this means
that it is important to measure not only beliefs but also the things
that make these beliefs true or false. All sorts of beliefs related to
child marriage could be false. People’s factual beliefs may be false.
For instance, a father’s belief that an unmarried girl’s integrity and
purity are doomed to be damagedmay be false. Hemay also falsely
believe that the law permits child marriage, or that the younger
the girl, the easier it will be for her to get attached to her husband
and his family.
Similarly, people’s social expectations can be false. First, their
empirical expectations can be false: a father might falsely believe
that almost everybody marries off their daughters young and
underestimate the number of later marriages. Second, people’s
normative expectations can be false: a father might overestimate
the number of people who believe that chastity is important. In
the very extreme case, it can be that everybody thinks that others
endorse the practice but, in fact, only a minority does. Because the
practice is widespread, but people fear to put themselves at a disad-
vantage by telling what they really think, everybody will publicly
endorse it, hence reinforcing a social norm most people dislike.
The situation in which a norm persists because many people are
ignorant about others’ true beliefs is called pluralistic ignorance.
That collective practices, be they norms or shared ratio-
nal responses, can be based on false beliefs is important for
interventions. If any of the factual beliefs people hold is false,
the possibility to inform them about the truth is a power-
ful tool. Similarly, if social expectations are incorrect, making
individuals’ true beliefs public is an important step toward
change.
THE USUAL MEASUREMENT TOOL: SURVEYS AND THEIR
LIMITS
In the following sections, we make use of the categorization of
collective practices we just described to construct a diagnostic
3We cannot say of personal normative beliefs that they are false, because these beliefs
do not refer to facts or people that we can at least in principle observe. Factual beliefs
and social expectations, however, can clearly be false.
tool for determining the exact nature of a collective practice. In
this section, we will discuss how to employ traditional surveys
to acquire information about people’s behaviors, preferences, and
beliefs about their options. In the next section we will discuss
what we can learn from behavioral experiments about incentiviz-
ing accurate answers, and in Section“MoreRealistic Tools: In-Kind
Incentives andVignettes”we look at other tools that better suit the
needs of organizations looking to evaluate their programs in the
ﬁeld.
A very popular tool to investigate the determinants of collective
practices is the knowledge, attitudes, and practices (KAP) survey.
KAP surveys are often part of theM&Eof programs to endharmful
practices, like child marriage (e.g., Save the Children Norway,
2011). Unfortunately, as the name indicates, KAP surveys typically
measure only factual beliefs (“Knowledge”), personal normative
beliefs (“Attitudes”), and collective behaviors (“Practices”). They
typically do not elicit social expectations.
Some surveys, however, do include social-expectations ques-
tions. Some large-scale household survey programs, like USAID’s
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) and UNICEF’s Mul-
tiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS), have been reﬁned to
incorporate social-norms related questions. Some of the smaller,
country-speciﬁc surveys, often part of the M&E of programs, also
provide data froma social normsperspective. For instance,Mahar-
jan et al. (2012) asked respondents“What are the positive effects of
childmarriage?,” and Sood et al. (2007) asked“Approximately, how
many girls are married early in your community?” and “Are peo-
ple in your area in favor of child marriage?”The resulting data can
give us indications about factual and personal normative beliefs,
empirical and normative expectations. Such data are the building
blocks in constructing a diagnostic of child marriage.
However, even if we piece together questions from several sur-
veys, more questions—and more carefully designed questions—
are needed to correctly diagnose the presence of social norms.
Because the above surveyswere not designedwith an adequate the-
ory of norms in mind, none of them clearly distinguish between
personal normative beliefs and normative expectations. We argue
that a diagnostic of child marriage requires at least the following
questions:
• BEHAVIOR: “At what age did your daughter(s) get married?”
• PRUDENTIAL REASONS: “If you think about a girl marrying
early rather than late,what are the advantages anddisadvantages
of that for the father of the girl?”
• EMPIRICALEXPECTATION:“Think aboutmarriedwomen in
between 18 and 25 years old in your community. Out of 100
such women, how many do you think got married before they
were 18 years old?”
• PERSONAL NORMATIVE BELIEF: “Some girls get married
before they are 18 years old. Is this good?”
• NORMATIVE EXPECTATION: “Out of 100 men in your com-
munity who are at least 40 years old, how many think that it is
good that girls get married before they are 18 years old?”
The diagnostic would work as follows. If fathers have strong
prudential reasons for their daughters to marry—like having to
pay a smaller dowry—then child marriage could be a rational
choice or a custom followed because it is in fathers’ own interest. If
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fathers have strong personal normative beliefs, then childmarriage
could be a moral rule. If there are no strong prudential reasons
or personal normative beliefs, but if people consistently hold the
empirical expectation that most other fathers are marrying their
daughters off early, then child marriage is probably a norm. If
people also hold the normative expectation that others think girls
shouldmarry early, then childmarriage is probably a social norm—
otherwise it is probably a descriptive norm.
None of these diagnoses are ﬁnal, however: the above questions
separate different kinds of motives, but this does not mean that
someof themcannot bepresent together. Onemayhaveprudential
andmoral reasons as well as social expectations.Whatmatters is to
uncover which motives inﬂuence behavior, and to what extent—
this is what ultimately determines the real nature of the practice.
Even if we know people’s prudential reasons, personal norma-
tive beliefs and social expectations, we still need to ﬁnd out what
causal role these potential motives play. To understand whether
social norms have causal inﬂuence, we want to manipulate expec-
tations and see how individuals’ choices change (orwould change).
Having conditional preferences means precisely that: were social
expectations to change, behavior would change, too. This can be
best done with behavioral experiments and vignettes, which we
shall discuss in the next two sections.
There is a second, major problem with surveys. In countries
where governments criminalize childmarriage andNGOs conduct
programs trying to end it, childmarriage ismorally, socially as well
as legally a sensitive issue. This difﬁculty implies that traditional
questionnaires might not give us reliable information (Raj et al.,
2011, p. 13). People’s expressed evaluation of childmarriagemight
be unreliable because of a social desirability bias—a tendency to
respond in ways that are thought to be appropriate. Respondents
might give morally, socially, or legally “correct” answers rather
than answers that reﬂect their true beliefs. Such bias is especially
likely when the research is conducted by organizations with a clear
pro-child agenda.
Social pressure might point in different directions. People’s
answers might conform to what they think government and the
NGOs approve of—marrying late, so as to enable education for
the girl. But theymight also conform towhat they think their com-
munity approves of—marrying young, so as to ensure a husband
for the girl. One might think that the latter bias is not so problem-
atic for identifying the presence of a norm. However, as we argued
earlier, to diagnose pluralistic ignorance, we need to accurately
elicit both personal normative beliefs and normative expectations.
If expressed personal normative beliefs merely reﬂect normative
expectations, such a diagnosis becomes impossible.
There have been several ways of dealing with the social desir-
ability bias that have been proposed over the years, and some
having been proven to be more effective than others. Crowne
and Marlowe (1960) proposed that social desirability should
be measured as a dispositional trait so that it could be con-
trolled for in analyses. Unfortunately their proposedmeasurement
(and similar alternatives; e.g., Reynolds, 1982) was developed for
use in an American population and validated with an Ameri-
can college sample, so many of the behaviors referred to in the
survey may not be considered “socially (un)desirable” in other
cultures.
Beyond detecting and controlling for social desirability,
researchers have proposed ways to actively reduce social desir-
ability in respondents. For example, one method is to force
respondents to choose between two or more equally socially
desirable options (e.g., Feldman and Corah, 1960). Unfor-
tunately, this particular method relies on the questionnaire
designer to guess what choice options would be equally socially
desirable to the typical respondent, which is often difﬁcult to
infer and may differ from respondent to respondent. Other
options include the “bogus pipeline” method that entails telling
the participant that they are being monitored by some form
of lie detector, thereby signaling to them that dishonesty is
futile (Jones and Sigall, 1971; Nederhof, 1985). This particu-
lar method is problematic not only because it necessarily entails
deceiving a participant (which can reduce their trust in the
researcher, especially if respondents see through the decep-
tion), but because it requires the researcher to bring a fake
machine with them that looks convincingly like a lie detec-
tor, something that would be particularly difﬁcult in ﬁeld
settings. Another example of a method of minimizing social
desirability would be to maximize the respondents’ anonymity
(Nederhof, 1985). Anonymity, however, is difﬁcult to attain
when dealing with practices such as child marriage in rural
areas where measurements have to be administered in person.
Moreover, even if full anonymity is attained, respondents may
continue to “lie to themselves” and respond in a socially desirable
way.
A more promising method to assess personal normative beliefs
(andobtain truthful answers) is the so-called randomized response
technique (Greenberg et al., 1969). Respondents secretly throw a
coin and must respond“yes” if it comes up tails, and are instructed
to respond truthfully if it comes up heads. Since anonymity
is guaranteed, it is assumed that those who get heads will tell
the truth. For example, in a community that widely practices
child marriage, the question should be “Some girls get married
before they are 18 years old. Is this good?”: half of the respon-
ders get tails, so half of the queried population will answer “yes”
regardless of whether they like the practice. Whatever is the pro-
portion of responders who say “no,” the true number is double
that amount since it is assumed that in a large randomized sam-
ple the two halves are approximately the same. This enables
the researcher to estimate the actual prevalence of supporting
beliefs without needing to know the true state of an individual
respondent.
One might argue that a social desirability bias is less of a prob-
lemwhen eliciting social expectations, because peoplewill bemore
ready to reveal that others are doing or approving of something
socially undesirable. This is only true to a certain extent, as peo-
ple might still be reluctant to admit that their community—their
in-group—is doing something undesirable in the eyes of the sur-
veyors. We suspect that this may happen in interviews that take
place in small and closely knit communities (usually villages).
Even if anonymity is guaranteed, subjects may feel compelled
to respond in ways that put their fellow villagers in a positive
light.
Yet another major problem in assessing social expectations is
that they may not be accurate, in that respondents do not have an
Frontiers in Psychology | Cultural Psychology December 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1418 | 6
Bicchieri et al. A diagnostic of collective practices
incentive to seriously guess what others really approve or disap-
prove of, and might be induced to project their own preferences
and beliefs.
TOOLS FOR ACCURACY: MONETARY INCENTIVES AND
ECONOMIC EXPERIMENTS
Even if a randomized response technique may solve the social
desirability problem in assessing truthful personal normative
beliefs, we are left with the problem of accuracy in assessing
social expectations. A potential solution that should be par-
ticularly effective in both experimental and ﬁeld settings is to
incentivize the elicitation of empirical and normative expecta-
tions. When accurate responses hold the promise of reward (i.e.,
when accuracy is incentivized), respondents are motivated to try
hard to make an accurate guess (Osband, 1989; see also Goetz
et al., 1984). Incentives ensure effortful thinking that can avoid
some of the biases to which “automatic” or System 1 think-
ing is subject (Epley and Gilovich, 2005). Importantly, these
incentives for accuracy provide an extra motivation to over-
come social desirability and answer honestly (Osband, 1989).
If respondents typically want to paint their community in a
good light (out of social desirability motivations), monetary
incentives will provide adequate reasons to overcome these moti-
vations and respond more accurately. Experiments on public
goods games have shown that elicited expectations about other
subjects’ contributions are more accurate when the elicitation is
incentivized (Gächter and Renner, 2010)4. Note, however, that
some scholars do not ﬁnd large differences (Delavande et al., 2011;
Eriksson and Strimling, 2014, p. 367).
In what follows, we take a look at how such incentives are used
in the economic experiments on fairness norms by Bicchieri and
Chavez (2010, 2013)5. Their experiments employ a variant of the
Ultimatum Game, a game often used in experimental economics.
One participant, the “proposer,” received 10 USD and has to pro-
pose a division of the money between him/herself and another
participant, the “responder.” The proposer has the following three
options: (1) $5 for him/herself and $5 for the responder; (2) $8
for him/herself and $2 for the responder; and (3) ﬂip a coin and,
if it is heads, it is $5 for him/herself and $5 for the responder
or, if it is tails, it is $8 for him/herself and $2 for the responder.
Then the responder could either accept or reject the proposal. If
the responder accepts, both players receive the amounts proposed.
If the responder rejects, nobody receives anything—it is an ulti-
matum. The possibility of rejection means that the responder can
4A potential problem is that Gächter and Renner (2010) also found that eliciting
beliefs (1) increases contributions and (2)makes the level of contributions depend to
a greater extent on beliefs. However, Bicchieri and Chavez (2010) ran one treatment
in which beliefs were elicited before playing the Ultimatum Game and another
treatment in which beliefs were elicited only after playing the game—so that the
elicitation could not inﬂuence behavior. LikeGächter andRenner (2010), they found
that eliciting beliefs before the game has an inﬂuence on behavior in the game. This
is an argument for eliciting beliefs after the game,which is what Bicchieri andChavez
(2013) did, and it is these data that we will use in what follows.
5Note that we will only discuss the parts of the experimental design and those
results that are relevant to our methodological discussion. Their experiment had
three information treatments, but we discuss only one. Moreover, we do not discuss
any of the author’s ﬁndings on norm evasion and norm manipulation which are
key to their 2013 paper but are not so relevant here. Finally, we only use the data of
Bicchieri and Chavez (2013).
“punish” a proposer for an unfair proposal. But punishment is
costly: if a responder rejects an $8-$2 proposal, the opportunity
cost is $2.
The experiment was designed to ﬁnd out whether proposers’
behavior is guided by a fairness norm, as opposed to a generic
preference for fairness. The $8-$2 option is clearly unfair. But
note that both the $5-$5 option and the coin-ﬂip option could
be justiﬁed as fair. The $5-$5 option could be perceived as a
fair outcome because it divides payoffs equally. On the other
hand, the coin-ﬂip option could be perceived as a fair procedure
because it is impartial, although it has an unequal expected payoff
of $6.5 versus $3.5. The authors wanted to know whether pro-
posers, torn between self-interest and fairness, would go for the
coin ﬂip—following the fairness norm that best serves their inter-
ests. They also wanted to know whether players indeed perceived
both $5-$5 and the coin ﬂip as fair options and, more impor-
tantly, whether players’ normative expectations were mutually
consistent, a sign that a social norm exists. Assessing the exis-
tence of a social norm is only the ﬁrst step though. We then
have to study under which conditions a norm will be followed,
i.e., whether a norm has causal power. In what follows, we dis-
cuss all these steps, from the elicitation of behavior and social
expectations to the causal inﬂuence of social expectations on
behavior.
Let us start by summarizing the results on the proposers’behav-
ior. Bicchieri and Chavez (2013) found that 12% of the proposers
chose the selﬁsh option $8-$2, and 88% chose one of the other
two options. 44% of the proposers chose the coin ﬂip and the
other 44% chose $5-$5. Note that these results give a more reli-
able picture of people’s fairness behavior than surveys could give.
Bicchieri and Chavez’s experiment elicits people’s behavior with
real monetary consequences, which reduces the potential social
desirability bias that could occur in a survey. If the authors had
asked people in a survey what they would hypothetically choose,
probably less people would have admitted preferring the self-
ish option $8-$2—or the self-serving “fair” option of ﬂipping a
coin.
Now, if proposers were inﬂuenced by social norms, this would
mean that their behaviors should depend on, ﬁrst, their empir-
ical expectations about the behaviors of other proposers and,
second, their normative expectations about the personal nor-
mative beliefs and the punishing behaviors of the responders.
Moreover, if there is indeed a social norm, it is possible that
it is sustained by false expectations and that there is pluralistic
ignorance, i.e., perceived and objective consensus are inconsistent
(Bicchieri, 2006).
Because they were speciﬁcally interested in the proposers’
beliefs about fairness, Bicchieri and Chavez (2010, 2013) did not
elicit proposers’ empirical expectations. However, they did elicit
the responders’ empirical expectations, and the questions they
asked responders provide a good example for eliciting proposers’
empirical expectations:
Please guess how many Proposers will choose:
(1) $5 for Proposer and $5 for Responder: _________.
(2) $8 for Proposer and $2 for Responder: _________.
(3) Let a coin ﬂip decide: _________.
For each line in which your guess is correct, you will earn a $1 bonus.
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Note how they incentivized the question to increase the reliabil-
ity of the answers. Systematically incentivizing social-expectations
questions was one of the novelties of Bicchieri and Chavez
(2010, 2013). Bicchieri and Chavez (2013) found that on aver-
age responders thought 44% of the proposers would choose
$5-$5, 28% would choose $8-$2, and 28% would choose the
coin ﬂip. Since we know what proposers actually chose, we
can evaluate the accuracy of the empirical expectations (and
pay subjects for correct guesses). See Table 2 for a compari-
son of empirical expectations with actual behavior. Additional
analyses of the data of Bicchieri and Chavez (2013) shows
that empirical expectations were only partly accurate. Respon-
ders’ empirical expectations of the proportions of proposers
choosing $5-$5 does not signiﬁcantly differ from the actual
proportion (Wilcoxon Sign-rank test, p = 0.793). However,
responders on average overestimate the proportion of proposers
choosing $8-$2 and underestimate the proportion of proposers
choosing the coin ﬂip option (Wilcoxon Sign-rank test, p-
values < 0.01). Though the discrepancy between responders’
empirical expectations about proposers’ behavior and proposers’
actual behavior was not relevant to the questions asked in Bic-
chieri and Chavez (2010, 2013), they provide a useful example
of how such discrepancies could be measured also for pro-
posers’ empirical expectations and how proposers’ behavior may
strongly correlate with their expectations of what other proposers
do.
Next, let us take a look at howBicchieri andChavez (2010,2013)
elicited the proposers’ normative expectations about responders
and how we can test the accuracy of these expectations. First the
authors elicited the personal normative beliefs of responders by
asking the following:
Please mark any options you believe are fair options. You are free to
choose none of the options, one, or more than one option. Your answer
will not affect your payment.
(1) $5 for Proposer and $5 for Responder [ ].
(2) $8 for Proposer and $2 for Responder [ ].
(3) Let a coin ﬂip decide [ ]6.
Then the authors elicited the proposers’normative expectations
about the responders with the following question:
Please guess howmanyResponders . . . have selected each of the options
in the above question as fair options:
(1) $5 for Proposer and $5 for Responder _________.
(2) $8 for Proposer and $2 for Responder _________.
(3) Let a coin ﬂip decide _________.
For each line on which your guess is correct, you will earn a $1 bonus.
A majority of proposers thought that 100% of responders con-
sider $5-$5 fair, that a large majority of responders consider $8-$2
unfair, and that a large majority of responders think the coin
ﬂip is fair. This tells us that proposers’ normative expectations
were mutually consistent, i.e., there was agreement that a fairness
norm exists and applies to their situation. The authors found that
the choices of the proposers correlate signiﬁcantly and strongly
with their normative expectations. For instance, proposers were
more likely to choose the coin ﬂip the more responders they
thought would deem the coin ﬂip fair. So proposers were plausibly
inﬂuenced by a social norm of fairness.
To know whether the proposers’ normative expectations about
the responders were accurate, they must be compared with the
personal normative beliefs of the responders. As we mentioned,
the authors found that 100% of the responders thought $5-$5 was
fair, 22% thought $8-$2 was fair, 52% thought the coin ﬂip was
fair (see also Table 2). Additional analyses conﬁrm that normative
6Note that it is impossible to reward subjects with a $1 bonus for accurately stating
their own fairness beliefs, because the only way to check the accuracy is to ask these
very subjects. Personal normative beliefs cannot be incentivized that way. But there
are other ways, beside the randomized response method we mentioned earlier: one
can for instance actually implement decisions about what is the fairest distribution
between two other unrelated subjects (Bernard et al., 2012).
Table 2 | Summary of data on behaviors, personal normative beliefs, rejection and social expectations in Bicchieri and Chavez (2013).
$5-$5 $8-$2 Coin flip
Behavior of proposers
(% of proposers)
44% 12% 44%
Empirical expectations of responders
(mean responder beliefs about % of proposers)
44% 28% 28%
Personal normative beliefs of responders
(% of responders)
100% 22% 52%
Proposers’ normative expectations about Responders’ personal
normative beliefs
(mean proposer beliefs about % of responders)
100% 10% 79%
Rejection by responders
(% of responders)
0% 25% 0% if $5-$5
0% if $8-$2
Proposers’ expectations of responders’ rejection
(% of proposers expecting majority to punish)
0% 52% 0% if $5-$5
22% if $8-$2
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expectations overestimated the perceived fairness of the coin ﬂip
and underestimated the acceptability of $8-$2, since normative
expectations signiﬁcantly differ from the actual normative beliefs
of responders (Wilcoxon Sign-rank test, p-values < 0.01 for both
$8-$2 and coin ﬂip)7.
Finally, Bicchieri and Chavez (2010) also elicited proposers’
expectations about the behaviors of the responders, that is, their
tendency to reject certain proposals. They asked proposers the
following questions:
• Will the majority of Responders accept $5-$5 not resulting
from a coin ﬂip? _________.
• Will the majority of Responders accept $8-$2 not resulting
from a coin ﬂip? _________.
• Will themajority of Responders accept $5-$5 resulting from
a coin ﬂip? _________.
• Will themajority of Responders accept $8-$2 resulting from
a coin ﬂip? _________
For each item you answer correctly, you will earn a $0.5
bonus.
No proposers expected the majority of responders to reject
when the proposal was $5-$5—whether this was the chosen option
or the outcome of the coin ﬂip. However, 52% of the proposers
expected the majority to reject when $8-$2 was chosen, and 22%
expected the majority to reject when the coin ﬂip was chosen and
the outcome was $8-$2. The authors showed that the proposers’
behavior correlates with their rejections expectations. Again, the
accuracy of the expectations about rejection can be tested by com-
paring them with actual rejecting behavior. As it turns out, only
25% of the responders rejected $8-$2 proposals, while nobody
rejected coin-ﬂip proposals—not even when the outcome turned
out to be $8-$2 (see Table 2). Of course nobody rejected $5-$5
proposals. Hence, expectations about rejections overestimated the
amount of rejections both for the $8-$2 and the coinﬂip proposals.
We have shown that the Bicchieri and Chavez (2010, 2013)
experimentswere able toﬁndout towhich extent people’s behavior
depended on their empirical and normative expectations. How-
ever, the fact that behavior correlates with social expectations
7It is interesting to notice that, the normative expectations of responders (about
other responders) were similar to the proposers’ normative expectations as they also
underestimated the proportion of responders who view $8-$2 as fair (mean = 15 vs.
22%, Wilcoxon Sign-rank test, p = 0028). However, there is no evidence that they
overestimated the proportion of responders who view the coin ﬂip as fair (mean= 46
vs. 52%, p = 0.223).
does not mean that a change in social expectations will neces-
sarily cause a change in behavior. In other words, knowing that a
social norm exists is just a ﬁrst step: we have to know under which
conditions it will be followed. Since conditional preferences are
necessary to follow a norm, and preferences are conditional on
social expectations, we have to check whether manipulating social
expectations will cause a change in behavior. For organizations
designing programs to change harmful practices, it is useful to
know whether changing social expectations will actually change
behavior.
Earlier, we discussed the problem of ﬁnding out the causal role
of social expectations (and other potential motives) in the con-
text of surveys. Now, experiments are an excellent tool to discover
causal relationships, and in another experiment Bicchieri andXiao
(2009) did exactly that. Their experiment employed a variant of
the Dictator Game, another game often used in experimental eco-
nomics, similar to the Ultimatum Game. One participant, the
“dictator,” who is called the “divider” in the experiment, received
10 USD and had to divide the money between him/herself and
another participant, the “receiver.” The divider had the following
seven options: $9-$1 ($9 for him/herself and $1 for the receiver),
$8-$2, $6-$4, $5-$5, $4-$6, $8-$2, and $9-$1. Unlike in the
Ultimatum Game, the receiver cannot reject the offer.
Bicchieri and Xiao (2009) manipulated social expectations by
giving dividers some (true) information about what other dividers
had said or done in previous experiments with the same Dic-
tator Game. They then asked dividers about their expectations
about the behavior and beliefs of other dividers in the present
game. The question was whether information about previous
games would inﬂuence present expectations and behavior. With
regard to empirical expectations, some dividers were manipulated
to expect fair behavior from other dividers, while other dividers
were manipulated to expect selﬁsh behavior. Similarly, with regard
to normative expectations, some dividers were manipulated to
expect others to believe that one should be fair, while other dividers
were manipulated to expect others to believe that one should
be selﬁsh. Table 3 shows the messages that manipulated social
expectations.
As a manipulation check, the authors elicited the dividers’
social expectations, in an incentivized way, like in Bicchieri and
Chavez (2010, 2013). The information given strongly inﬂuenced
players’ social expectations. More important, the expectation
manipulations inﬂuenced dividers’ behavior. For instance, a
Table 3 | Messages used in Bicchieri and Xiao (2009) to manipulate social expectations.
Empirical expectations Normative expectations
Fair “60% of the dividers who participated in a session of this
experiment last year shared the amount approximately
equally (i.e., chose option $5-$5 or $6-$4).”
“60% of the dividers who participated in a session of this
experiment last year said that dividers should share the amount
approximately equally (i.e., choose option $5-$5 or $6-$4).”
Selﬁsh “60% of the dividers who participated in a session of this
experiment last year approximately maximized their own
earnings (i.e., chose option $9-$1 or $8-$2).”
“60% of the dividers who participated in a session of this experiment
last year said that dividers should approximately maximize their
own earnings (i.e., choose option $9-$1 or $8-$2).”
The part of the message that differs is in bold.
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regression analysis showed that the probability that a dictator
chooses a fair option ($5-$5 or $6-$4) increases by about 6% if
his/her empirical expectations of fair choices changes from 45 to
50%. The Bicchieri and Xiao (2009) experiment allows one to
conclude that social expectations have causal inﬂuence on fair
behavior.
MORE REALISTIC TOOLS: IN-KIND INCENTIVES AND
VIGNETTES
The economic experiments discussed above should be considered
as ideal tools rather than exact molds. When studying norms in
the wild, experiments like the ones just discussed are likely to
be problematic. Nevertheless, understanding such experiments is
useful. By understanding the ideal, one can start thinking about
alternatives that can achieve similar results. For example, experi-
ments tell us that incentivizing answers about social expectations
solves the accuracy problem, a tool we may use also in surveys.
Experiments also let us measure both consensus and compliance.
If normative expectations are mutually consistent we can be rea-
sonably sure that a social norm exists, and manipulating social
expectations tells us if the norm has causal power, i.e., under
which conditions it will affect behavior. Modiﬁed surveys can tell
us if normative expectations are mutually consistent, but they
may not work if the goal is to measure causal efﬁcacy. In this
section, we discuss a few alternatives, like in-kind incentives and
vignettes.
When studying child marriage, it is not an option to “manip-
ulate” expectations and then observe whether behavior changes.
We cannot invite fathers to the lab and ask them to make real deci-
sions about marrying off their daughters. The best we can do is
ask them at what age they married off—or will or would marry
off—their daughters. But we can still incentivize the elicitation
of social expectations. For deontological reasons, organizations
might be weary of using monetary incentives. However, one could
reward correct answers with useful presents, like food or vouch-
ers. Below is an example of incentivized questions about people’s
social expectations regarding child marriage:
• EMPIRICALEXPECTATION:“Inwhat follows youwill be asked
to make a guess. If you guess correctly, you win 1 pound of
dried ﬁgs. We interviewed many men (at least 40 years old) with
married daughters in your community, and we asked them the
following question:Atwhat age did your daughter(s) getmarried?
Out of 100 married girls/women, how many do you think got
married before they were 18 years old?”
• NORMATIVE EXPECTATION: “In what follows you will be
asked to make a guess. If you guess correctly, you win 1 pound
of dried ﬁgs. We interviewed many men (at least 40 years old)
with married daughters in your community, and we asked them
the following question: Some girls get married before they are
18 years old. Is this good? Out of 100 men, how many do you
think answered that it is good?”
Asking such questions enables one to elicit social expectations
and evaluate their accuracies in ways similar to the experi-
mental methods used in Bicchieri and Chavez (2010, 2013),
and Bicchieri and Xiao (2009). Such questions require careful
design. In particular, if we want to be able to evaluate the
accuracy of the social expectations of respondents, we have to
make sure that empirical-expectation questions match behavior
questions, and normative-expectation questions match personal-
normative-belief questions. Suppose we asked people about their
personal normative beliefs with the question suggested earlier
(“Some girls get married before they are 18 years old. Is this
good?”), but, instead of the normative-expectation question sug-
gested above, we ask the following modiﬁed (and ill-matched)
version of the normative-expectation question: “Do you think
people in your community believe that it is a father’s duty to
marry off daughters as soon as possible?” Because this ques-
tion does not match the personal-normative-belief question, it
becomes impossible to evaluate the accuracy of the normative
expectations.
One might wonder whether manipulating social expectations
raises deontological concerns. First, note that the Bicchieri and
Xiao (2009) experiment did not involve deception, which would
violate a fundamental methodological precept of experimental
economics. Both the messages stressing fairness and the messages
stressing selﬁshness were true, since there had been actual sessions
with these particular outcomes. Expectations were manipulated
merely by being selective in presenting information. Still, orga-
nizations might ﬁnd experiments with manipulations difﬁcult to
implement.
If experiments with manipulations are difﬁcult in the ﬁeld,
surveys that would have to ask hypothetical questions do not fare
much better. Imagine asking a father the hypothetical question
what he would do if he were to realize that most people in his
reference network have decided to abandon childmarriage or have
become strongly opposed to the practice. A likely answer from
the father would be that this is not and probably will never be
occurring, as he knows what people in his network do and believe.
Hypothetical questions are difﬁcult, as they require the capability
to answer “what if” questions, and imagine scenarios that may
seem prima facie impossible. Contrary-to-fact hypotheticals, for
example, require the ability to assume as true a claim that conﬂicts
with what is accepted as true, and the lack of such ability may lead
to deny that the suggested scenario is possible. It may be easier
to answer hypothetical questions about ﬁctitious characters than
questions about actual family and friends. This is what vignettes
accomplish.
Similar to experiments, vignettes make use of manipulation to
arrive at causal knowledge8.Vignettes tell short stories about imag-
inary characters in speciﬁc scenarios (Alexander and Becker, 1978;
Finch, 1987). Asking respondents about these stories can effec-
tively elicit beliefs and expectations: they are particularly useful
when the questions being asked are socially sensitive and sub-
ject to social desirability biases (Finch, 1987). In these stories,
respondents will not feel the same obligatory pressures to respond
in a particular way. These hypothetical scenarios provide an
unthreatening and impersonal avenue for exploring respondents’
attitudes or beliefs about a sensitive topic.
8While KAP-style surveys are still the norm in social-norms research, some scholars
are already using vignettes to assess whether a social norm is present (e.g., Sorenson
and Taylor, 2005; Mathew and Boyd, 2011; for other examples see Strimling and
Eriksson, 2014).
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For instance, we can give respondents stories about a father
in some community who is wondering whether to marry off his
young daughter or to let her ﬁnish school.We can then ask respon-
dents what they think this father would ultimately do, why he
would do that, and whether it is what the father should do (see
the example questions in Table 4). We can also vary what others
in this ﬁctional father’s community are doing or what they are
approving and disapproving of (i.e., we can manipulate the social
expectations of the protagonist of the story). In the stories some
respondents get, all the other men are arranging early marriages,
whereas in alternative stories the other men send their daughters
to school until they ﬁnish high school. In some stories, all the other
men think that marriage and chastity is inﬁnitely more important
than education for girls, whereas in other stories the other men in
the ﬁctitious community recognize the importance of education
(see Table 4).
Another important variable to manipulate is the role in the
community that people depicted in the story have. In some sto-
ries, it might be other men in the village that say that good fathers
arrange marriages as soon as possible. In other stories, it might be
the mother in law, or religious and community leaders. By learn-
ing exactly whose opinions and behaviors matter, we can identify
what we earlier called the reference network. Identifying the refer-
ence network is useful because, if we can change the opinions and
behaviors of this reference network, we are more likely to change
the opinions and behaviors of the entire community.
Note that in vignettes like the ones we suggested we would
be manipulating the social expectations of the protagonist of the
story, and not those of the respondent. However, most individuals
are subject to what is known as a “false consensus effect” in that,
when not aware of dispositional or person-speciﬁc information,
they infer that a decisionmaker would behave as if they themselves
would when in a particular situation (Ross et al., 1977; Mullen
et al., 1985). When respondents think about what the protagonist
would do, they imagine what they would do if they were in the
position of the protagonist. Thus, vignettes indirectly teach us
something about how the respondent would react. Similarly, by
manipulating the protagonist’s social expectations, it is as if we
were manipulating the respondent’s social expectations. In that
sense, vignettes are quasi-experiments. Moreover, the indirectness
of vignettes helps eliminate the social desirability bias, since we
ask people what they think some other individual in another com-
munity will think and do instead of posing the questions directly
about themselves.
By manipulating social expectations, we will not only be able to
say whether something is a social norm or not, but we will also be
able to spot individual differences in sensitivity to social norms. In
other words, wewill ﬁnd out who ismore autonomous than others.
Autonomy is the ability and desire to make one’s own choices, to
choose what one really wants, and to reﬂect on what one might
want (Chirkov et al., 2011; Bavetta and Navarra, 2012, Chap. 3),
rather than having others make choices for you and decide for you
what you want. Many child marriage programs aim at empow-
ering women (e.g., Sood et al., 2007)—at increasing their level of
autonomy—so that they can abandon harmful social norms and
perhaps even take the lead in the collective process of change.
Hence, measuring individual differences in autonomy and norm
sensitivity can add substantial value to the design of effective inter-
ventions as well as child marriage M&E. To gain a comprehensive
understanding of respondents and their motivations, it would be
useful to analyze vignette data in conjunction with survey data.
Despite the many beneﬁts that the use of vignettes offers, it is
worth acknowledging they do have some potential pitfalls. Any
vignette designer must be careful that the vignette is not so com-
plex or alien that the respondent has trouble understanding or
relating to it (Finch, 1987). Moreover, it is possible that respon-
dents will “ﬁll in” the missing information of a particular vignette
in different ways; for example, some respondents might imagine
that Mr. Badji is Muslim, and others might imagine that he is
Hindu (or Christian, or agnostic). Thus, it is worth making any
Table 4 |Vignettes that manipulate social expectations.
Empirical expectations Normative expectations
Marry early “Mr. Badji has been visited by a very respectable family who
want their son to marry Mr. Badji’s daughter. It is a very good
opportunity, but Mr. Badji’s daughter is 15 years old and still
going to school. Most girls in the village marry before they are
16 years old.”
“Mr. Badji has been visited by a very respectable family who
want their son to marry Mr. Badji’s daughter. It is a very good
opportunity, but Mr. Badji’s daughter is 15 years old and still going
to school. People in the village say a good father arranges a
good marriage as soon as a good opportunity arises.”
Marry late “Mr. Badji has been visited by a very respectable family who
want their son to marry Mr. Badji’s daughter. It is a very good
opportunity, but Mr. Badji’s daughter is 15 years old and still
going to school. Most girls in the village marry after finishing
high school, at 18 years old or later.”
“Mr. Badji has been visited by a very respectable family who
want their son to marry Mr. Badji’s daughter. It is a very good
opportunity, but Mr. Badji’s daughter is 15 years old and still
going to school. People in the village say a good father
arranges a good education first, and only after that he
arranges a good marriage.”
The part of the story that differs is in bold. Questions to be asked about these vignettes are: In your opinion, will Mr. Badji ultimately agree to the marriage of his
daughter [behavior]? Why [preferences]? What (if anything) might drive Mr. Badji to agree to the marriage [preferences]? What (if anything) might drive Mr. Badji to
say no to the marriage [preferences]? Do you think Mr. Badji should agree to the marriage [personal normative belief]?
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critical details explicitly stated so that respondents do not imagine
the scenarios in different lights (thereby adding undesirable noise
to the data)9.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a theoretical framework that can guide
the M&E of progress in ending child marriage. M&E is difﬁcult
because there are many possible explanations of child marriage.
We have shown how a general framework can be built on the basis
of a simple model that explains the behavior of individuals in
terms of the preferences they have, the options they face and the
beliefs they hold about these options. We have gradually reﬁned
this model by introducing different kinds of beliefs—non-social
and social—and different kinds of preferences—unconditional
and conditional. Child marriage has proven difﬁcult to curb, and
one of the reasons is undoubtedly the fact that it is sustained by
preferences conditional on expectations about others’ behaviors
and beliefs.
There are empirical, precise tools we can use to assess social
expectations, to diagnose collective practices, and ultimately to
guide interventions and M&E. We have discussed here surveys,
experiments, and vignettes. These tools have been commonly used
in social-science empirical research. To be adapted to a general
explanation of child marriage they need several modiﬁcations.
Surveys should be incentivized and enriched by asking clear social-
expectations questions. Experiments can teach us how to uncover
social norms and how to manipulate expectations to understand
what induces people to obey them.Vignettes are useful in the ﬁeld,
where it is impossible to manipulate social expectations directly.
They allow for indirect assessment of how changes in social expec-
tations would affect behavior, and whether some expectations are
more important than others. By guiding empirical research with
precise theoretical tools we can accomplish what has been difﬁ-
cult, if not impossible, to do up to know: to provide a general
explanation for some common practice that has often deﬁed the
best-intentioned intervention.
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